JUDICIAL POWER, THE "POLITICAL
QUESTION DOCTRINE," AND
FOREIGN RELATIONS
Michael E. Tigar*
The words "political question doctrine" are set off by inverted
commas to denote my view that there is, properly speaking, no
such thing. Rather, there is a cluster of disparate legal rules and
principles any of which may, in a given case, dictate a result on
the merits, lead to dismissal for want of article three' jurisdiction,
prevent a party from airing an issue the favorable resolution of
which might terminate the litigation in his favor, or authorize a
federal court in its discretion and as a matter of prudence to decline
jurisdiction to hear a case or decide an issue. A redefinition of the
"political question doctrine" and isolation from it of other possible
bases for refusal to decide constitutional issues are the burdens of
the concluding sections of this article.
One conclusion of that analysis will be that the legality, in
some accepted sense of the term, of American participation in an
undeclared war in Indochina is susceptible of judicial resolution
in a properly brought case. This conclusion is, I am sure, unsurprising: It has been reached by others.' I have been and remain
unsatisfied, however, by the historical, logical and textual constitutional support thus far marshalled for such assertions. And I am
disturbed by the way in which formulations of the "political question doctrine" by the Supreme Court 8 and by ardent and articulate
adherents of the doctrine threaten to debase the currency of legal
rules and norms as constraints upon American military action.
* B.A., 1962, J.D., 1966, University of California, Berkeley. Acting Professor of
Law, University of California, Los Angeles. Much appreciation is due Robert W.
Zweben, a third-year student at the National Law Center, George Washington University, without whose research assistance, ideas, and valuable suggestions this article
would not have come to be.
1 U.S. CoNST. art. III.
2 See, e.g., Schwartz & McCormack, The Justiciability of Legal Objections to
the American Military Effort in Vietnam, 46 TEx. L. REv. 1033 (1968); Hughes,
Civil Disobedience and the Political Question Doctrine, 43 N.Y.U.L. Rav. 1 (1968).
Compare United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515, 520 (D. Mass. 1968);
Scharpf, Judicial Review and the Political Question: A Functional Analysis, 75 YaLE
L.J. 517 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Scharpf].
3 See, e.g., Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 209-237 (1962); Powell v. McCormack,
395 U.S. 486, 517-49 (1969), discussed in Comments on Powell v. McCormack, 17
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 1 (1969). See also Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (opinion
of Frankfurter, J.).
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This article begins with a discussion of the limitations-constitutional, statutory and decisional-upon the power and duty of
federal courts to decide cases and controversies. I conclude that,
contrary to a view often expressed in recent years, the federal courts
do not have an ambulatory and discretionary power to refuse decision of cases over which they have jurisdiction. In the second
section of the article, I focus particularly upon the "political question doctrine" in historical perspective, and argue that it was at
its origin and through the first century of its development a collection of legal rules grounded in constitutional principle and not at
all a device for leaving litigants without an authoritative decision
of questions involving the separation of powers. In the .concluding
section, I urge that the federal courts-in light of proper limitations
on their power and in particular the doctrine of "political questions"
-have the power, and in an appropriate case, the duty, to decide
the constitutional and federal law issues posed by American military involvement abroad, in Indochina today and in any future
conflict.
I. A 'CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THEORIES OF JUDICIAL POWER
Alexander Bickel has written what is unmistakably the most
studied and eloquent analysis of the political question doctrine in
the decisional law of the Supreme Court, and has done so in the
context of an impressive reformulation of the grounds upon which
the Supreme Court may refuse to decide constitutional issues and
cases.' Professors Wechsler' and Gunther' have each joined the
issue, and Professor Scharpf, 7 in an article in Yale Law Journal,
8

has sought to resolve the debate by shifting its ground.

4 A. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH (1962) [hereinafter cited as BICKEL], (especially Chapter 4, "The Passive Virtues").
5 H. WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 3-48 (1961) [hereinafter cited as WECHSLER]; Wechsler, Book Review, 75 YALE L.J. 672 (1966).
6 Gunther, The Subtle Vices of the "Passive Virtues"--A Comment on Principle
and Expediency in Judicial Review, 64 CoLum. L. Rxv. 1 (1964) [hereinafter cited
as Gunther].
7 Scharpf, supra note 2.
s Bickel, in THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH, focused upon the Supreme Court
to the virtual exclusion of the lower federal courts in setting out the constitutional
theory of which his discussions of the political question doctrine is constitutive. See
BICKEL at 173. Indeed, Professor Wechsler has faulted this preoccupation, saying that
"the conception of judicial review has never been regarded as a special doctrine
governing the role of the Supreme Court, as distinguished from the lower courts in
the judicial hierarchy; and the techniques for the avoidance of decision that Bickel
so lucidly describes are addressed to the propriety of any judicial intervention, not
merely to adjudication by the highest court." Wechsler, Book Review, 75 YALE L.J.
672, 675 (1966). I think Wechsler's criticism is unjustified. The Supreme Court is
different from the lower federal courts, in ways which both indispensably support
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The central thrust of Bickel's argument is that the Court
ought in a number of situations-which Bickel describes suggestively but not exhaustively.--refrain from deciding issues or cases
brought to it. Among the devices available for "not doing"-to be
employed when one agrees that a particular case should not be decided-is the "political question doctrine." There are, however,
others, and Bickel refers to all these devices collectively as the
"passive virtues."9 These devices fall into two categories in Bickel's
analysis: constitutional limits on the power of the Court and prudential limits self-imposed as rationales for declining to exercise
jurisdiction which article three clearly gives. The constitutional
limits inhere in the "cases" and "controversies" language of article
three, with its requirements of adversity, constitutional standing,
and unavoidably cast doubt upon Bickel's hypothesis. We must, when considering
limitations upon the "judicial power," prudential or constitutionally mandated, mark
well that the Court sits not so much to safeguard the rights of litigants as to superintend the positive law of the American federal system. Certainly this is true for
the years since the establishment of the discretion to deny certiorari, and thus avoid
an adjudication on the merits, and is documented in the formal and informal law
of granting or denial of the writ. Sup. CT. R. 38, 39, 41, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254-56 (1964) ;
BICKEL at 173; WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 15; H. M. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1394-1422 (1953) [hereinafter cited as
HART & WECHSLER]. Even in the years which preceded the grant of this discretion
in 1925, the Court was apart not merely because at the apex; since the time of
Marshall, its overtly and designedly political role in shaping American institutions
has distinguished it from lower courts. The Court is, after all, the only judicial institution mentioned in the Constitution. Its early and repeated clashes with co-ordinate branches and with the states are a part of every history schoolbook. For
lawyers, Charles Warren's treatment remains the best. C. WARREN, THE SUPREME
COURT IN UNITED STATES HISTORY (1947) [hereinafter cited as WARREN]. See also A.
BEVERIDGE, THE LIFE OF JOHN MARSHALL (1919). Much of the explanation of the
Court's dominant position in shaping the philosophy of judicial power lies, no doubt,
in the Justices' circuit trial court assignments, which persisted until 1869. 2 WARREN
at 501. The Burr case, some of the rulings in which caused President Jefferson acute
anguish, was tried on circuit by Marshall. Marshall ruled that the President was
amenable to service of process. United States v. Burr, 25 Cas. 30, 34 (No. 14,692d)
(C.C.D. Va. 1807). See 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2371, at 750-51 (McNaughton rev.
ed. 1961). The Habeas Corpus Case, a direct (though in the end ineffectual) challenge to President Lincoln, was authored by Taney, sitting on circuit in Baltimore.
See 2 WARREN at 368-74. Justice Story's opinions on circuit were often designed as
innovative. See, e.g., Greene v. Darling, 10 Fed. Cas. 1144 (No. 5165) (C.C.D. R.I.
1828); Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: Compensatio from Rome
to California, 53 CAUF. L. REV. 224, 251-52 (1965). See generally 1 WARREN at
158-68.
Bickel does not, if I understand him, say that the lower courts should not use
devices such as the political question doctrine to avoid adjudication on the merits.
Rather, he focuses upon the Supreme Court because, since Marbury v. Madison, 5
U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 "(1803), no constitutional pronouncement save the Court's is
final and authoritative, and because the Court itself, rather than the "federal courts"
generally, has stood at the center of controversies over the role of the judiciary in
the federal system.
9 BiCXEL at 111.
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and a dispute sufficiently ripe to be denominated a "case." 10 The
prudential limits upon the exercise of power include species of standing" and ripeness,"' as well as the discretionary power to deny
10 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring); Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346 (1911). The definition of the Court's
proper role began in earnest with its refusal to give President Jefferson an advisory
opinion on questions of foreign relations, see HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at
75-76, and with the Court's declination to administer a veterans' pension system,
Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792).
The "case and controversy" requirement is essentially a command that the federal courts limit themselves to deciding lawsuits in the adversary mold: there must
be real, not feigned, adversity of interests; the parties must have a stake in the
outcome of the controversy in which one stands to win or the other to lose something in consequence of the judgment; and the controversy must have reached a
point in development that permits the parties to demonstrate how the legal rules
for which each contends will work a harm upon the loser or confer a benefit upon
the winner. It is easy to see that the "case and controversy" requirement carries
with it a number of assumptions which more broadly underlie the "adversary system," with its supposition that the parties to a dispute will be motivated by selfinterest to develop fully the factual and legal arguments behind their dispute. See
generally C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 12 (1963).
11 "Standing" is a term which gives lawyers, scholars and courts considerable
difficulty. See generally Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968). Perhaps the confusion
has been encouraged, if not engendered, by careless use of the term to refer to
several quite distinct limitations upon the power and the willingness of federal courts
to entertain claims of violation of federal rights. The varying and sometimes recondite uses of "standing" in the cases make analysis doubly difficult.
First, "standing" is sometimes used to refer to the procedural capacity of a
litigant to sue or be sued. See A. EHRNZWEio, CONFLICT Or LAWS §§ 11-24 (1959).
Second, "standing" is sometimes used to denote a limit upon the judicial power,
and to refer generally to the requirement that litigants have a genuine and not a
sham contrariety of interests, both qualitatively and quantitatively. Cases in which
the requisite "qualitative" adversity was lacking include Muskrat v. United States,
219 U.S. 346 (1911), and FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470 (1940).
The question is double-edged in these cases: will the Court decline, on the basis of
judicially-fashioned rules of restraint to take the case? (see Muskrat); and, on the
other hand, may Congress bestow standing upon a class of litigants without falling
afoul of the proscription on advisory opinions--stated affirmatively as the case or
controversy requirement (see Sanders Bros. Radio Station). The "quantitative" dimension of standing was considered in Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83 (1968), in which
the Court limited Frothingham v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923). Frothingham had rejected a taxpayers' suit directed at a federal statute upon the ground that the interest
of a taxpayer in the outcome of the litigation was but a comminute share of the
interest of the community at large, and not sufficiently direct and immediate. See
also Doremus v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952).
A third use of the term "standing" has been in reference to questions essentially
of ripeness. United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956), is such a
case. There the FCC had adopted a rule stating that licenses for television broadcasting would not be granted if the applicant had a direct or indirect interest in
more than five other stations. Storer, which had reached the limit under the rule,
sued for a declaration that the rule was invalid. This Court concluded that Storer
had "standing" to sue, resting its decision upon a perception of the statutory judicial
review standard and a finding of present harm to Storer. 351 U.S. at 197-99. The
Court recognized that "standing," in the sense it had used the term, carried along
with it the notion of ripeness. Taking the question before the court out of "standing" language, one could cast it as, "Should Storer have gone through the licenseapplication process before coming to court?" This requirement may also be termed
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certiorari or summarily dispose of an appeal.'" Bickel also includes
among the passive virtues some principles of substantive law-the

"void for vagueness" doctrine 4 and the law of delegation of auone of "finality." See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123,
154-56 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
A fourth "standing" issue is that of "legal wrong," a term which appeared in
section 10 of the old Administrative Procedure Act and which now appears in the
judicial review provisions of recodified Title 5, 5 U.S.C. § 702 (Supp. IV 1969). See
United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 198-99 (1956); Tennessee
Elec. Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118 (1939). The "standing" issue in "legal wrong"
cases really goes to the merits of the claim being asserted, for "standing" is denied
or upheld based upon whether the harm complained of is legally cognizable.
Fifth: Closely related to the fourth meaning but distinct from it, is the issue
of "standing" raised when B seeks to complain of a violation of rights which are
said to "belong" to A. Mr. Justice Frankfurter termed this the problem of "directness." Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 153-54 (1951).
This fifth notion of standing has been an issue in search and seizure cases, most
recently Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969). In these cases, the Court
has held that in a case, United States v. A, A cannot complain of the admission into
evidence of items unawfully seized from B.
All of the foregoing five definitions of "standing" may operate to limit judicial
review of illegal searches and seizures, though obviously in different ways. For example, if the Court should decide that a criminal defendant may challenge the
admission into evidence against him of any and all material seized in violation of the
fourth amendment, it might limit the rule to post-indictment motions under FED. R.
CIV. P. 41(e), and retain the traditional concept of standing for pre-indictment Rule
41(e) motions. The ground for such a distinction might rest upon principles of
"standing" in the sense of "ripeness": a potential defendant, not yet indicted, might
be held to be not close enough to being harmed by illegality which did not violate
"his" right of privacy. The Court might not, that is, wish to decide the fourth
amendment question until it had to. See Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 .U.S. 123, 155 (1951) (Frankfurter, J. concurring).
Another application of the fifth definition of "standing" is Barrows v. Jackson,
346 U.S. 249 (1953). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963). Other "vicarious assertion" cases are collected and analyzed in Sedler, Standing to Assert Constitutional Jus Tertii in the
Supreme Court, 71 YALE L.J. 599 (1962), and in the opinions of Justice Frankfurter in Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v. McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 149 (1951).
See also the opinion of Mr. Justice Jackson which, while it does not extensively
discuss legal theory, characteristically takes a workman-like and practical approach
to the issues. 341 U.S. at 186-87. Compare the opinion of Mr. Justice Black, 341
U.S. at 142, with the opinion of Mr. Justice Douglas, 341 U.S. at 174.
12 There are some lawsuits ripe enough to be cases and controversies, but as to
which the Court may nonetheless decline jurisdiction, in order that the parties may
have a chance to use nonjudicial means to settle the controversy or in order that the
way in which the legal rules in issue will affect the litigants will become clearer. See,
e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967); note 11 supra.
13 The power summarily to dispose of an appeal is not the power to avoid an
adjudication on the merits, at least technically. Compare WECESLEr, supra note 5,
at 4-15, 47 and Gunther, supra note 6, at 10-13 with BIcxEL at 71, 126, 174.
14 See Note, The Void for Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U. PA.
L. REv. 67 (1960). The doctrine is not a device for avoiding constitutional adjudication, of course, for it rests upon the proposition that statutes, to satisfy due process
requirements, must provide an ascertainable standard for the conduct of those to
whom they are addressed. Many modern applications of the doctrine are in the free
speech field, where precision of regulation is necessary to ensure that statutes do not
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thority.15 These last are means of avoiding decision of constitutional
issues, not of avoiding decision altogether.
The "political question doctrine," Bickel argues, is rooted both
in the Constitution and in considerations of prudence. For its constitutional basis, Bickel accepts Professor Wechsler's formulation:
I submit that in cases of the kind that I have mentioned, as in others
that I do not pause to state, the only proper judgment that may lead
to an abstention from decision is that the Constitution has committed
the determination of the issue to another agency of government than
the courts. Difficult as it may be to make that judgment wisely, whatever factors may be rightly weighed in situations where the answer is
not clear, what is involved is in itself an act of constitutional interpretation, to be made and judged by standards that should govern the
interpretive process generally. That, I submit, is toto caelo different
from a broad discretion to abstain or intervene. 16

But, Bickel argues, there is also a discretionary power, rooted in
considerations not of constitutional command but of prudence, to
refuse to decide "political questions" when they meet the following

test:
Such is the foundation, in both intellect and instinct, of the politicalquestion doctrine: the Court's sense of lack of capacity, compounded
in unequal parts of (a) the strangeness of the issue and its intractability to principled resolution; (b) the sheer momentousness of it,
which tends to unbalance judicial judgment; (c) the anxiety, not so
much that the judicial judgment will be ignored, as that perhaps it
should but will not be; (d) finally ("in a mature democracy"), the
is electorally
inner vulnerability, the self-doubt of an institution which
7
irresponsible and has no earth to draw strength from.'
tred upon protected rights. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963) ; Aptheker v.
Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 516 (1964).
Bickel's justification for including the doctrine among the reasons for "not doing"
is therefore difficult to understand. It has been applied in cases posing deep conflicts
between branches and in federal-state cases of some moment. See United States v.
Robel, 389 U.S. 258 (1967); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965); Comment, The
University and the Public: The Right of Access by Nonstudents to University Property, 54 CALIF. L. Rrv. 132 (1966).
15 "Delegation" cases are today among the most controversial on the docket. I
do not, of course, refer to the old-style cases in which the Court flayed the Congress
and Executive for abdication of responsibility and held delegations of power void for
being standardless and overbroad. See L. JAFFE, JUDICIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATIV
AcTIoN 41-72 (1965). Since Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958), in which the Court
held the Secretary of State had no authority to deny passports based on the political
affiliations, and Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959), in which the Court held

that the Department of Defense lacked authority to deny security clearances without
a hearing, the Court has asked "has the administrator been given the power he
claims?" as a means of avoiding decision of serious constitutional questions. See,
e.g., Gutknecht v. United States, 396 U.S. 295 (1970); Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S.

17 (1968); United States v. Robel, 389 U.S. 258, 269-82 (1967) (Brennan, J. concurring).
10 WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 13-14.

17 BIcKEL at 184.
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In order to evaluate Bickel's view of the political question doctrine,
one must see it in the context of his lengthy discussion of the "passive virtues." Analysis of Bickel's theory also provides a framework
within which to view competing views of the Court's constitutional
jurisdiction.
It should be clear that in pursuit of his main theme-the value
of devices for not deciding-Bickel has aggregated the most disparate sorts of legal rules and principles, and, as I shall argue, in
a way which poses dangers to values which he, in common with
many, regards as worthy of protection. I do not speak here of the
difficulty in regarding summary dispositions of appeals as a means
of not deciding; Professor Gunther has considered this question
in detail.' 8 Nor do I intend to comment in detail upon the confusion
which may spring from including vagueness and delegation rationales
as among the passive virtues.' 9 Two propositions lie at the heart of
Bickel's theory: first, that the Court as an institution is incapable
of deciding certain kinds of issues and occupies a position in the
constitutional system which counsels it to avoid decision of other
issues; second, that the Court may permissibly take refuge in a
series of justifications for not deciding which he enumerates and
defends. As to the first point, I believe him to have idealized the
concept of the frame of government to a level of abstraction leading to conclusions unsupported in the history of the Court and our
lawlife. On the second, I think he has propounded a theory of judicial non-review which, if taken by the Court as the basis of its
work, will isolate it still further from the forces which make its
decisions responsive to democratic values and even from the arguments made by counsel for litigants at its bar.
A.

The Court as a Counter-MajoritarianInstitution

The Court's role, for Bickel, is defined by its "counter-majoritarian" character, which he deduces from the Court's position in
the constitutional scheme. 0 Justices are not popularly elected, they
serve for life, are not expressly made responsible to anyone nor
any principle save that of "good behavior," 2 and were surely conceived of by the framers as inclined to check excesses generated
by the popular will. The framers' intention is reflected in part in
the constitutional basis for judicial review in the service of conSee note 6 supra.
19 See notes 14 & 15 supra.
18

20 BICKEL at 16-23.
21 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. See Chandler v. Judicial Council of the Tenth Cir-

cuit, 382 U.S. 1003, 1004-06 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
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stitutional principle.22 But if we examine the Court in the performance of the judicial review function, we see that it is no more
counter-majoritarian in the nature of things than the Congress and
the President are majoritarian in the nature of things. The Court
affirms and enforces many constitutional values which are not in
the mold that permits it to be described as counter-majoritarian.
Now, the "counter-majoritarian" aspect of its duty is no doubt
important: free speech, free press, religious liberty, due process,
among other values, have all at times been safeguarded by the Court
against attack by institutions representing the majority of Americans then qualified to vote." But it is also true that the Court, in
tending constitutional principles, upholds values which make majoritarian institutions work, and which prevent them from being
subverted and overthrown by the powerful forces which strive to
harness state power to their interests. Surely majoritarian principles
justify, if they were not the explicit rationale for, the white primary 4 and reapportionment25 cases, and even a number of free
speech cases, in which the free and open debate thought essential
to the maintenance of democratic institutions has been safeguarded.2
Majoritarian principles may even be advanced as plausible and intelligible justification for the representative-seating cases of Bond
v. Floyd 7 and Powell v. McCormack.28 Yet these cases are among
those in which the Court has been criticized, and even by Professor
Bickel, 29 for being too venturesome. Granted that in the reapportionment field the lack of judicially-manageable standards may be
and has been advanced as a sufficient ground for judicial non-review, but Bickel at any rate has not chosen to take this ground save
as subordinate to his main concern with the Court's institutional
80
role.
22

See Wechsler, supra note 5, at 5-10, and the authorities he cites; HART &

WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 312-40.

23 This article is not concerned with whether the "majoritarian" institutions
truly do, or ought to, reflect popular will. There is no claim that the country or its
institutions are in any absolute sense responsive to the will of the people who are
subject to them. See Tigar, Book Review, 78 YAL L.J. 892 (1969). A longer essay
on this subject, "The Jurisprudence of Insurgency," will appear in the Fall of 1970 in

a collection issued by Pantheon and edited by Professor Herman Schwartz.

24 E.g., Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461 '(1953); Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649
(1944).
25 E.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
26 See New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
27 385 U.S. 116 (1966). Bond held that the Georgia legislature violated Bond's
first amendment rights by refusing him a seat because of his beliefs and utterances.
28 395 U.S. 486 (1969). To underscore the point, Powell was brought into court
by Powell himself and thirteen of his constituents, suing as class representatives
under FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
29 BxcKEL at 189-97.
80 Id.
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Indeed, one may suggest that the principal difference between
most of the judicial activism of the early 1930's and most of the
activism of the Warren Court is in the latter Court's assertion of
its widest powers of review in precisely those areas in which the
democratic process needed the Court's protection in order to survive or come into existence. It is not therefore, permissible to label
the court a "counter-majoritarian" institution if by this term is
meant that the Court must inevitably uphold, or has usually upheld, antidemocratic principles.
Now it may be objected that I have missed the meaning of
"counter-majoritarian," and that it has reference for Bickel not to
the values in whose service a particular Court may be, but to the
process of decision itself by a group of men who are not accountable
in the same sense that legislators and Presidents are accountable.
That is, the Court's power has only the Constitution to justify it,
while legislators and the President can point to a popular mandate
which gives them a legitimacy apart from the constitutional sanction given their powers. Of course, such an assertion would not be
strictly accurate, for the nomination and confirmation process, as
well as myriad subtle forces of which Professor Bickel is supremely
aware, exert pressures from institutions which are, in the constitutional scheme of things, majoritarian3 1 But if Bickel's argument
rests upon the premise that the Court is institutionally countermajoritarian in the constitutional system; there is, in addition, both
a formal and a logical objection to it. First, whatever the appellation is intended to denote, it has an undesirable connotative content
for Bickel, and his argument is unclear as to whether political philosophy or the framers' intent-or maybe both-counsel the Court
to restrain itself. And this is the formal objection: the connotation
of "counter-majoritarian" as "in fact" undemocratic is clearly invoked to persuade us of Bickel's view, while the term denotes only
the Court's institutional position in the constitutional system and
is defended by reasoned argument only to this extent.
The logical objection is this: if the term "counter-majoritarian"
refers only in a specific descriptive sense to the Court's institutional
role in the separation of powers scheme, then the term has no
normative content whatever. It simply tells us a fact about the
81 Whether or not Mr. Dooley was right in saying that the Supreme Court reads
the election returns, pressure upon the Court from majoritarian institutions has
taken and may take the form of proposals (successful and unsuccessful) that Congress
limit the Court's jurisdiction, proposals such as FDR's "court-packing" plan, and
refusals by responsible executive officials to enforce the Court's commands. See

Wechsler, The Courts and the Constitution, 65 CoLum. L. REV. 1001 (1965); 1
WAP=, supra note 8, at 729-79; Kaplan, Comment, 64 CoLum. L. Rzv. 223 (1964).
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Court, not analytically different from the fact that there are to be,
under article one, two Senators from each State. We cannot deduce
from this assertion anything about what the Court should do, or
what the framers intended that it do. Any argument which attempts
to lead from the assertion that the court is "counter-majoritarian"
to the assertion that it should decide or refrain from deciding in
particular ways must necessarily go beyond consideration of the
institutional arrangement of the branches of government to make
a normative judgment.
To put the matter differently, any admonitions that Professor
Bickel, or Professor Wechsler, or I, may address to the Supreme
Court are precatory, in the sense that the Court can decide any
case that reaches it and read out a decision which announces any
rule of law upon which the justices decide. Our test for determining which admonitions are wisest, or truest, will customarily be
whether they follow logically upon precedent as decided by the
Court, whether they have a demonstrable constitutional footing in
the text of the document as read in the informing light of history,
or whether they follow from premises about democratic government
which we state and gain assent to before taking the step of setting
out our admonitions.
In sum, I wonder at the utility of the term "counter-majoritarian" as a touchstone for analysis of the Court's proper role. The
term has the quality of vagueness and elusiveness which will not
yield when one seeks to isolate from it identifiable elements of
justification for Professor Bickel's argument. It is rooted in neither
history, nor precedent, nor in the article three limitations on the
judicial power. Insisted upon as a rationale for non-decision, the
spectre of counter-majoritarianism may permit forces outside the
Court to turn institutions majoritarian by design into institutions
majoritarian in name only. If we are truly seekers after the democratic values conjured by the connotations of majoritarian, we do
not need the passive virtues in quite all the splendor and with quite
all the breadth in which Professor Bickel offers them. Rather, our
precatory admonition to the Court must be an immensely more
subtle one resting upon a concern that the power of review which
is plainly there be limited in ways which attend the overriding interests of democratic control of institutional decisions and protection of individual liberty against majority or minority incursion.
Some of the justifications for not deciding issues or cases will be,
in the nature of legal principles, based upon considerations of practical wisdom, some upon textually-demonstrable constitutional rule,
and others upon a concern for democratic values.
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B. Can One Be Virtuous Though Passive?
But what of the virtues themselves, taken one at a time? Are
they not reasonable? Certainly as principled bases of non-decision
many of them are unexceptionable. What has worried many of
Bickel's critics is the assertedly unprincipled way in which Bickel
urges that virtue be practiced.
Bickel lists, as I have said, the justifications for not deciding
cases or issues. Then there appears this paragraph:
It follows that there are limits to the occasions on which these
doctrines and devices may be used, limits that inhere in their intellectual content and intrinsic significance. Indeed, with the possible exception of what I have called ripeness of the issue, which is merely a
catch-all label for a certain order of considerations relating to the
merits, none of these techniques totally lacks content of its own, and

none is thus always available at will. Even the device of certiorari
has some intrinsic meaning and will not be readily usable on all occasions. This is doubly true of the other concepts I have dealt in. Yet

one or another of them will generally be available, and there will often
be room for choice among two or three, and room certainly for an

election whether or not to resort to any. We have had steadily in view
the process of election-the82 elements that enter into a decision to
avoid a constitutional issue.

This paragraph has been taken, and not without justification,
as a clarion call for abandonment of principled bases of decision. 3
Analyzed by one anxious to find fault, Bickel seems to say that
when a majority of the Court feels that it must not or cannot or
should not decide a constitutional case, it will in most cases find
some one of the passive virtues ready to hand. The practice of the
most appropriate or most justifiable passive virtue will then solve
the feeling of unease about deciding the hard case. The apparent
willingness to permit the passive virtues to become post hoc justifications for refusal to decide has aroused Bickel's critics, both
because principled decisions are generally to be preferred and beof cynicism contradicts his insistence
cause Bickel's implicit defense
84
elsewhere upon principle.
To the extent that one shares Professor Wechsler's view of
the Court's power to refrain from deciding federal constitutional
questions, there is a further ground for criticism. 35 Wechsler's position is essentially this: the Constitution has made a choice of the
82 BICKEL at 170.
Gunther, supra note 6, at 10.

83

84 Id. at 12-13.
35 See note 5 supra.
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limits on the Court's power not to decide. It has determined which
hard questions the Court may legitimately duck, and has even provided indisputably and clearly for judicial review in the Marbury
v. Madison sense. The checks upon this power, including those derived from congressional limitations of the Court's jurisdiction,
mark also the limits within which the duty of judicial review must
be performed.
Moreover, Bickel, it is shown above, premises much of his argument upon the assertedly "counter-majoritarian" character of
the Court. One of the ways in which the Court is counter-majoritarian lies in its insulation from contemporaneous social goals and
values hammered out in the democratic process. But a willingness
-indeed eagerness-to decide cases upon grounds not stated militates against whatever responsibility may be built into the system
by which the Court's members are appointed and live and work.
The Court's decisions, or non-decisions, to the extent that they rest
upon grounds not articulated, are insulated from public criticism
and debate. This debate has an impact upon the Court to an uncertain, though undeniably important, extent.
Further, and particularly in constitutional cases, the Court's
willingness to regard abstention from decision as a principle in itself without a clearly-articulated set of reasons for not deciding
insulates it from arguments made at its bar by advocates for the
persons and interests whose legal rights are in issue. That is, if the
Court looks first to ill-defined considerations of appropriateness in
deciding whether to decide, and then seizes upon the justification
for not deciding which lies most readily at hand, it will become
impossible for counsel to argue out in a rational way the reasons
why not deciding is or is not appropriate. Arguments about the
passive virtues, in certiorari petitions, jurisdictional statements,
briefs and oral argument, will become sophistic in the sense that
gave Sophists a bad name in Athens:"6 disputation will mask the
subject of discussion rather than advance consideration of it.
It is important for the Court to be responsive to advocates at
its bar, for with the increasing importance of institutional litigants
-the Solicitor General,17 the American Civil Liberties Union, the
NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund 8 and so on-in the
Court's constitutional caseload, advocates are more than ever rep88 B. RussELL, A HISTORY Or WESTERN PHILOSOPHY 73-81 (1945).

87 Werdegar, The Solicitor General and Administrative Due Process: A Quarter
Century of Advocacy, 36 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 481 (1968).
8 See the Court's acknowledgement of these groups in NAACP v. Button, 371

U.S. 415, 431 (1963). See Ginger, Litigation as a Form of Political Action, 9 WAYNE
STATE L. REv. 453 (1963).
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resentative of the public interests served or harmed by differing
decisions on constitutional issues, and therefore objectively counter
the forces which tend to isolate the Court from democratic values
and goals. It will do nothing save nurture legal fictions39 if decisional rationales, or rationales for avoiding constitutional decision,
are transmuted into mere devices to be employed in the service of
other values.
The Bickel cosmology of virtue also erodes, because it pays
little attention to, the independent and quite important justifications
for a number of the "passive virtues," other than the justification
for all of them in the large that they promote passivity. The devices which Bickel collects under the name passive virtues have
less in common than they have to distinguish themselves from one
another, and it may certainly be argued that he does not carry the
burden of persuading the reader that they should be regarded as
relatively interchangeable.
A final point: Bickel overlooks the differing impact of a decision not to decide upon litigants in different postures: civil plaintiffs,
civil defendants, criminal defendants, and habeas corpus petitioners, and by this means obscures the distinction between a decision
on the merits and a procedural dismissal. This distinction has, as
is argued below, at least as important a consequence as the "declaration of non-unconstitutionality" which Bickel argues persuasively accompanies the rejection of a constitutional claim on the
merits. °
C.

Another View of the Judicial Power

It is certainly true that constitutional crisis may be avoided
through refusal by the Court to decide constitutional issues. But
there are times past in which such a refusal would have carried
disastrous consequences, or at least would have undermined the
Court's ability to play the role which even Professor Bickel would
agree that it must.41 My reluctance to find a virtue in passivity is
illustrated by my reaction to his suggestions that the Court should
have ducked the constitutional issues in Dred Scott and taken so
long in deciding the Steel Seizure Case that the parties could work
89 Legal fictions have their uses, of course, in an open, common law system. They
are often new legal rules travelling incognito. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW (1st ed. 1861).
40 BIcKEL at 130-31.
41 Given some uncertainty over President Eisenhower's will to enforce judicial
commands about integration, see Kaplan, supra note 31, at 223, the decision in Cooper
v. Aaron, 385 U.S. 1 '(1958), is surely such a case. So, too, were Cherokee Nation v.
Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), and Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137
(1801). See generally 1 WARREN, supra note 8.
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out a settlement. In both of those cases the appropriateness of the
Court's action seems not open to doubt.
Dred Scott 42 arose when forces on either side were gathering
for a showdown on the slavery issue. Politicians were choosing positions, orators were exhorting, John Brown was fighting in Kansas,
and the conflict between the industrial and agrarian economies was
taking the path which was to end in Civil War.4 3 In the midst of
the struggle, there was the view that the matter might somehow
be smoothed over by a Supreme Court decision on slavery."' But
in retrospect, one can, I think, see that the clash was all but inevitable, and that some basic dislocation of the constitutional structure established in 1789 was necessary to deal with the question
of slavery and reallocate national commitments to establish the
primacy of free labor. The Court's candid declaration in Dred Scott
was a signal that if slavery was to be dealt with, it would have to be
through the political departments of government, through the amending process, or failing that, in some more violent way. In Dred Scott
the Court in effect declined an invitation to rewrite the constitutional compact by sanctioning the piecemeal destruction of Southern
interests, and refused at the same time to take the unprincipled
course of raising hopes that it would do so at some time in the future when the case became riper, or when some other condition
was fulfilled that made the passive virtues less virtuous.
In the Steel Seizure Case,4" the Court's intervention stands as
proof that in some instances the Court can be sensitive to the problem of governmental illegality so swift to take its toll that only
immediate and authoritative judicial action will do any good. Action
which comes later is of no use: damages are not adequate (or not
available against the sovereign), and an injunction to the responsible official not to do similar conduct in the future is unavailable
if the plaintiff cannot show an immediate threat that the challenged
conduct will be repeated. A refusal to decide in such a case, or a
delay which obviates the need to decide, suggests to the alleged

B.

42 Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857).
43 See W. WILLIAMS, THE CONTOURS OF AMERICAN HISTORY 284-300 (1961);
DUNHAm, HEROES AND HERETICS 443-50 (1964); A TREASURY Or GREAT REPORTING

139-43 (L. Snyder ed. 1962).
44 2 WARREN, supra note 8, at 294-300, recounting Justice Grier's assurance to
President Buchanan, which led the latter to predict in his inaugural address that the
question of slavery was about to be "finally settled" by the Supreme Court, a reference to Dred Scott..
45 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952). In these cases,
President Truman had ordered the steel mills seized and run by federal troops, invoking a generalized "war power." The Court upheld the mill owners.
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offender that the challenged exercise of power 48is worth the risk
again since there is no practical restraint upon it.
Granted that the power-wielder may disregard the Court's admonition in such a case as the Steel Seizure Case, but violation of
an express judicial command may either provide an occasion for
the political process to function by causing public censure of the
official, or demonstrate that the political process is ineffective to
redeem the constitutional promise of justice and must therefore be
changed in fundamental ways.
Dred Scott and the Steel Seizure Case are merely examples
which raise broad-gauge considerations about constitutional adjudication. What may we say are the relevant criteria in assessing,
in general, the Court's obligation to decide a constitutional case?
To begin, I put aside any question about the propriety of con47
stitutional judicial review. There is no need to redo that argument.
We come then to a number of identifiable limits on the power, or
the duty, or both, to decide. First, there are a group of constitutional and statutory limitations framed with specific reference to
the federal courts. The jurisdiction of federal courts is limited by
48
article three to cases and controversies. Thus, the Court must
refuse to decide a constitutional issue or other federal question
when the claimant lacks a stake in the outcome of the litigation,
or the claim lacks maturity to the extent that a judicial opinion
would not affect real as opposed to hypothetical and speculative
interests. Too, the Court may determine that it has not been given
the power to decide the issue-that the power resides elsewhere to
formulate the judgment the claimant seeks. 49 There are, in addition,
a host of other jurisdictional requirements, some finding express
textual support in the constitution 0 and others enacted under the
congressional authority over the "inferior federal courts" and over
the appellate jurisdiction. 5 The plaintiff in any action bears some
46 Bickel elsewhere shows his sensitivity to this problem in quoting Justice Jack-

son's warning of the result of validating the power asserted in the Japanese relocation
cases. BICKEL at 131, quoting Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242, 245-46
(1944) (dissenting opinion). See generally J. TEN BROEK, E. BARNHART & F. MATSON,
PREJUDICE, WAR, AND THE CONSTITUTION

47

(1954).

See note 5 supra.

48 See notes 10-12 supra.
49 See text accompanying notes 95-99 infra.
50 E.g., the diversity jurisdiction, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. See Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
51 See WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 14. The extent of Congress's power to limit
the jurisdiction of the federal courts is discussed in HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8,
at 312-40.
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burden to show that factually and legally the prerequisites to jurisdiction are satisfied, and the court must at least go far enough
to decide whether it has jurisdiction.5 2
The second source of limitation upon the Court's power -lies
in the law of remedies and the substantive law which the Court
superintends.5" To take one example, there are some instances in
which equity denies an injunction because the matter is simply
too complicated for the chancellor to administer.54 As another instance, the Supreme Court has decided that in a criminal case
styled United States v. A, A cannot complain of the admission into
evidence against him of evidence obtained in an unlawful search
of B, because the harm to A is not sufficiently direct or immediate
for the remedial law to take notice of.55 In each of these cases
there is nothing in the constitution which forbids a federal court
to act. The court could make a new or different rule about the
injunctive power, and since it clearly has jurisdiction of the criminal case and A is clearly harmed by the governmental conduct in
question, there is no constitutional inhibition upon the Court saying
that he has "standing." 5
A third limitation upon the Court's power is the canon of
interpretation which counsels against deciding a constitutional issue
when the claimant can get all the relief he wants on a nonconstitutional theory. Stated more broadly, the Court seeks the narrowest
possible ground on which to decide.57
The fourth and final limitation upon the exercise of judicial
power is the most controversial. 58 This limitation is the discretionary refusal to decide a case or issue of which the court has
jurisdiction and which falls within the substantive and procedural
mold of cases in which the law customarily or in the run of cases
provides a remedy.5" Refusal, for want of ripeness or for failure
52 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL COURTS § 16 (1963).

53 The sources of law which the Court administers are various: the Constitution;
laws and treaties of the United States; customary international law, The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398
(1964); the admiralty law, Hess v. United States, 361 U.S. 314 (1960); and state
law in diversity cases, Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). As to Erie, see
text accompanying note 144 infra.
54 27 Am.JuR. 2d Equity § 106 (1966).
55 See note 11 supra.
56 Id.
57 See, e.g., Kent v. Dulles, 357 U.S. 116 (1958).
58 The limitation is upon the "exercise" of power, not upon the power itself.

59 One might include here such doctrines as that the Court will not consider the
invalidity of a statute at the insistence of one who has availed himself of its benefits.
Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 345-48 (1936) (Brandeis, J., concurring), and the
roundly criticized principle that the Court will not entertain a constitutional challenge
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to exhaust administrative remedies, to hear a case, falls into this
classification. This final class of discretionary grounds for non-decision is the one whose defensibility traditionalists regard as questionable at best, though for Professor Bickel it is essential to the
maintenance of the Court's proper relationship with coordinate
branches of government. I suggest, however, that such discretion60
ary devices for decision-avoidance as (nonconstitutional) ripeness,
primary jurisdiction, 61 and some applications of the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies,62 are entirely defensible as a
matter of both prudence and constitutional principle. Disagreement
with this view rests, I think, upon an uncritical equation of the
power to decide with the duty to decide.
It is one thing, after all, to say that every claimant asserting
a federal right has, subject to the constitutionally-exercised power
of the Congress over the jurisdiction of article three courts, the
right to a federal judicial forum in which to litigate his claim on
merits. It is quite another thing to say that whenever a litigant
in such a posture presents a claim in a judicial forum that the court
must then and there decide it. There is no principled objection
that I can see to the Court, for reasons entirely aside from the
restrictions on timing of litigation inherent in the general law of
remedies, declaring that considerations of federalism or comity, or
regard for a coordinate branch of government require that it not
now decide the constitutional issue tendered by the claimant. So
long as the effect of such a decision is only to require the claimant
to exhaust other remedies, or to await a greater danger of harm to
his federally-protected right, so long as it is clear that these doctrines are court-made means to serve principled purposes, and so
long as it is understood that they may be discarded when other
principles require it,"5 there is no retreat from the general principle
to a statute at the behest of one whose violation of the statute was covertly fraudulent.
Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855, 864-67 (1966).
60 See note 12 supra.
61 See L. JAFFE, JUDicIAL CONTROL OF ADmINISTRATrvE AcaioN 121-51 (1965).
62 See generally McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969). "Ripeness" de-

notes the degree of factual and legal development of the principles at stake in the
action. "Exhaustion of administrative remedies" denotes a requirement that the
litigant aggrieved by governmental action present his claim to some administrative
body for determination; if he fails to do so, he may be denied a judicial remedy
altogether since the administration avenue that he "ought" to have pursued may be
closed. McKart contains a discussion of this principle. "Primary jurisdiction" denotes
a decision about allocation of initial competences to decide.
63 When constitutional liberties are at stake, the courts have been quick to cast
aside ripeness, exhaustion and primary jurisdiction barriers to decision. See, e.g., Wolff,
v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 16, 372 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1967); Dombrowski v.
Pfister, 380 U.S. 479 (1965). Even the presence of a clearcut statutory interpretation
issue may lead the Court to say that, for example, the "exhaustion" requirement should
be dispensed with. McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969).
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that a federal forum must be generally available for the decision
of any federal claim. 4 Retreat from that principle, to iterate, must
be sounded by the Congress under its article three powers, or by
the Court upon a finding that article three does not reach the claimant's case. The refusal to decide based upon ripeness, or exhaustion, or primary jurisdiction is the deferral of decision, not the
abdication of authority to decide. Deferral of decision may, of
course, result in never having to decide, for the other forum may
resolve the problem or the threatened harm never come to pass.
It should be noted as well that deferral of decision is not possible with respect to cases in all procedural postures. It is difficult
to justify in a habeas corpus case, in which the petitioner asserts
that he is detained in violation of the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States, and the custodian must come forward and
state the grounds for the detention. For a court to assert, in such
a case, that while it has authority, under the Constitution and the
statutory grant of habeas jurisdiction, to decide, it will in its discretion refuse to do so, leaving the petitioner in custody, appears
justifiable upon no ground of constitutional principle or generally
applicable precedent.65 Similarly, when the claim of federal right
is raised in defense of a criminal prosecution in which the impact
of refusal is that the claimant is convicted, refusing to decide cannot be justified by resort to any generally applicable principle. 6
More of this in the concluding section.
II.

WHAT

Is-AND Is NoT-A POLITICAL QUESTION

I have sought thus far to outline a general view of the limitations upon the power and duty of federal courts to decide cases
and controversies involving claims of federal right. This discussion
provides an introduction to and framework within which to view
the following discussion of the "political question" doctrine. The
view taken here of the power and duty to decide is, I submit, borne
out by a critical analysis of the political question cases decided
prior to Colegrove v. Green,"7 the reapportionment case undercut by
Baker v. Carr.68 The principal defect in political question discus64 See generally HART & WECESLER, supra note 8, at 312-40. Compare Ex parte
McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 506 (1868) with Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.)
85 (1868). See also Oestereich v. Selective Serv. Local Bd. No. 11, 393 U.S. 233, 239
(1968) (Harlan, J., concurring).
65 See generally R. SoxoL, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS 1-27, 308-40, 346-47 (1969).

See Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1869).

66 See notes 172-75 infra and accompanying text.

67 328 U.S. 549 (1946).
68 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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sions in Colegrove and after, I shall argue, rests upon an insufficient attention to the detailed principled justifications for judicial
refusals to decide issues and cases.
Indeed, the current discussions of the political question doctrine are characterized by either a level of generalization which
approaches the meaningless, or a simple enumeration of the "political question cases" without an attempt to analyze their various
rationales. The Wechsler formulation of the political question doctrine, quoted in section I of this article, terms a political question
one which the Constitution requires to be decided by an organ of
government other than the judiciary. This view does not intelligibly
account for all the cases, though it comes closest of any current
definition to having a foundation in constitutional principle. Bickel
defines the political question doctrine, in the passage quoted in section I, in terms of the Court's sense of unease at straying into the
decision of difficult and delicate questions involving the separation
of powers and requiring "political" expertise or sensitivity to make
an intelligent decision. Bickel's view is perhaps a direct descendant
v. Green that "[c] ourts
of Justice Frankfurter's dictum in Colegrove
' 69
ought not to enter this political thicket.
Another important contemporary statement is that of Justice
Brennan in Baker v. Carr, a statement the more significant because
it concluded with the holding that reapportionment of state legislatures is not a political question:
It is apparent that several formulations which vary slightly according to the settings in which the questions arise, may describe a
political question, although each has one or more elements which
identify it as essentially a function of the separation of powers.
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is found a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment
of the issue to a coordinate political department; or a lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards for resolving it; or the
impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court's
undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the
respect due coordinate branches of government; or an unusual need
69 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946). To the extent that Frankfurter's
Colegrove opinion held that the political question doctrine was one of federalism
rather than of separation of the powers of the three constitutional limbs of govern-

ment, his view was rejected in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. at 210. This rejection was
proper, as the discussion below will show. Turning to Frankfurter's discussion of the
political question cases in Colegrove, his short summary of a few leading cases, 328
U.S. at 556, describes the political question as foreclosing judicial inquiry into
decisions committed finally to other branches. There is no hint that this determination is to rest on other than careful analysis of the constitutional provisions invoked
as a barrier to decision. See text accompanying notes 78-114 infra.
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for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made; or
the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements
by various departments on one question. 70

Justice Brennan also attacked the question from a different
direction by enumerating the fields in which the doctrine had been
applied: foreign relations, 71 status of Indian tribes,7 dates of duration of hostilities7 3 validity of certain legislative acts, 74 and repub75
lican form of government cases.
The Brennan formulation may at first sight seem the most
reasonable, for it at least seeks to classify the cases in which nondecision is appropriate, and to enumerate in detail the elements
of a decision not to decide. However, comfort drawn from the Baker
v. Carr formulation is short-lived when one sees that presence of
any element justifying non-decision, or the determination that a
case is in a field in which non-decision is appropriate, is a necessary
but not a sufficient condition precedent to refusing decision. The
lengthy list of elements and "fields" of non-decision ultimately advances analysis no more than Bickel's or Justice Frankfurter's
shorter, more suggestive definitions. One is still left with an illdefined, discretionarily-applied "barrier" to decision."
All of these definitions, it seems to me, rest upon a mistaken
legal and historical premise. I say this not because of the simple
fact that courts, having the power to decide whether they have the
power to decide, are the arbiters of the limits upon this doctrine.77
Rather, attention to the doctrine's history reveals that it is-in the
full-blown terms in which Justices Brennan and Frankfurter and Professor Bickel set it out-a recent invention based upon a misreading
or distortion of the early "political question" cases. Surely this
failure to take account of its early definition and meaning is important in assessing whether the doctrine has any basis in article
three, and surely the acute and repeatedly challenged sense of the
proper spheres of the branches of government expressed by Marshall, Story, Taney and their contemporaries should have some
70

369 U.S. at 217.

71 Id.
72 Id.

at 211-13.

78 Id.

at 213-14.

at 215-17.

Id. at 214-15.
7 Id. at 218-26.
76 Id. at 214: "the political question barrier falls away."
77 The "power" to decide, to which this article is addressed, might better
be
termed the "legal capacity" to decide, to distinguish this use of the term "power"
from use of the term to signify "might." The Romans had a word for each concept
of "power": potentia means "might," and potestas refers to "legal capacity" or
"jurisdiction."
74
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weight in assessing the prudential considerations said to support
the maintenance and even expansion of the doctrine. That is, if
it can be demonstrated that the political question doctrine has not
historically had the role and meaning assigned to it by some justices and some scholars, then one will be left to argue whether there
are any prudential or textual constitutional reasons for refusing to
decide.
Turning to the early political question cases, we see that they
fall into several groups, none involving discretionary refusals to
decide, and only one involving a "barrier" to decision in the Baker
v. Carr sense.
A.

Cases Assessing Generally-Addressed Commands by Co-ordinate Branches

In Williams v. Suffolk Ins. Co.,7 8 the plaintiff sued for loss of
ship and cargo upon a marine insurance policy issued by the defendant. The defendant claimed that the master of the insured
vessel had been negligent, in that he had persisted in taking seals
off the Falkland Islands after a demand by the government of Buenos Aires, which claimed jurisdiction over the Falklands, that he
refrain from doing so. The President of the United States had repeatedly asserted that the islands were open to vessels of all nations,
including the United States, for hunting seals. The Court determined that it would not interfere with the executive's determination.
The precise question framed by the circuit court and certified for
determination was:
Whether . . .it is competent for the Circuit Court in this cause, to

inquire into and ascertain by other evidence [than that used by the
executive in making its determination], the title of said government of
Buenos Ayres to the sovereignty of said Falkland Islands; and if such
evidence satisfies the Court, to decide against the doctrines and claims
set up and supported by the American government ....79

The Court held that the decision as to which nation or government
has sovereignty over an island or country is for the executive
branch to make, given its power respecting foreign relations. "The
action of the political branches of the government, in a matter that
belongs to them, is conclusive." 80
Ten years earlier, in Foster v. Neilson,8' the plaintiff had sued on
an 1804 Spanish land grant. The defendant disputed the title, claim78

79
80

81

38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 415 (1839).
Id. at 417.
Id. at 420.
27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253 (1829).
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ing that the territory in question had not been in the Spanish government's domain at the time of the grant. The Court held for the
defendant, noting that the United States, through both the executive and legislative branches, had taken the position that all titles
purportedly based upon grants like the plaintiff's were at least presumptively void. A commission had been established by the Congress
to try out the question in individual cases. The Court upheld the
executive and congressional determination.
The principle established in these cases, and others decided
in the same period, was carried forward into this century in Oetjen
v. Central Leather Co. 2 There the dispute was over the ownership
of hides confiscated in Mexico by Pancho Villa, acting under
a commission from the revolutionary government of General Carranza. The Court upheld the title of the party claiming through
the Carranza government, upon the basis that that government had
been recognized by the United States. Recognition of a foreign government by the executive branch, the Court held, binds the judicial
branch. The legitimacy of the Carranza government having been
established, the Court proceeded to uphold the taking of the hides
(although it might have cut the inquiry short on this score merely
by invoking the act of state doctrine) .83
These cases, typical of many which speak of political questions
in the context of foreign relations, invoke no barrier to decision
of the lawsuit before the Court. The Court's decision is no more
nor less than an assertion that the Constitution commits to the
executive branch the power to recognize foreign governments, and
to make a determination of the territorial limits of the sovereignty
of the United States and other nations. The statement "this is a
political question and the Court will not upset the Executive's determination" is no different analytically from the statement "this
is a question arising under the commerce clause and the congressional enactment before us was within the power of Congress to
pass." The Court, that is, decides that the President has acted
within his powers in making a declaration, based upon the ascertainment of "legislative facts,"84 and amounting to a "law or rule,"
in the sense of a "command" which "obliges generally to acts or
82 246 U.S. 297 (1918).
83 Id. at 303-04. The Court in Oetjen spoke expressly of the "act of state"
doctrine. See also Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964). The
"act of state" doctrine, a principle of federal law derived through analysis of the
customary international law which the Court applies under the authority of The
Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900), is a principle of recognition of transnational
judgments or decrees.
84 See generally 1 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE §§ 7.02, 7.06 (1958).
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forbearances of a class." The Court's decision in each of these
cases determined that the law or rule in question was within the
legal power of the person making it to make, then formulated an
individually-addressed command based upon it. This individuallyaddressed command, which one might term "occasional or particular" in the sense that it "obliges to a specific act or forbearance,
or to acts of forbearance which it determines specifically or individually,"8' 5 was embodied in the Court's judgment.
As another instance of the same principle, consider the Chinese Exclusion Case, 6 in which the Congress had passed a statute
which arguably abrogated a treaty with the Emperor of China. The
Court said that "[t] he question whether our government is justified
in disregarding its engagements with another nation is not one for
the determination of the courts,"87 and its holding amounts to the
assertion that the Congress has the constitutional power to abrogate
treaties by the process of enacting subsequent legislation.
Cases Involving an Application of the Parol Evidence Rule
88
Another species of case is represented by In re Baiz, in which
the Court held that the petitioner was not entitled to diplomatic
immunity from process. The Court said at the conclusion of its
opinion:
B.

Regarding the matter in hand as, in its general nature, one of
delicacy and importance, we have not thought it desirable to discuss
the suggestions of counsel in relation to the remedy, but have preferred to examine into and pass upon the merits.
We ought to add that while we have not cared to dispose of this
case upon the mere absence of technical evidence, we do not assume
to sit in judgment upon the decision of the executive in reference to
the public character of a person claiming to be a foreign minister, and
therefore have the right to accept the certificate of the State Depart-

properly
ment that a party is or is not a privileged person, and cannot 89
be asked to proceed upon argumentative or collateral proof.
Baiz deals with the diplomatic immunity provisions of law now

codified at 22 U.S.C. §§ 252-53. These provisions have been often
85 The language is that of J. AuSTIN, TnE PROVINCE OF JURIsPRUDENcE DETER-

MrNED 18-26 (Hart ed. 1954). Austin is here drawing a distinction between "individually-addressed" commands, which are issued (under the American constitutional
system) to individuals or readily-identifiable groups by the judiciary or the executive
branch, and generally applicable legal rules or principles which are a part of the
legislative function. The orthodox distinction between "adjudication" and "rulemaking" in administrative procedure suggests the difference.
86 Chae Chan Ping v. United States, 130 U.S. 581 (1889).
87 Id. at 602.
88 135 U.S. 403 (1890).
89 Id. at 431-32.
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construed, and it is usual to accept State Department certifications
concerning the status of a person claiming immunity 0 To the extent that these certifications are relied upon in the manner approved
in Baiz, the Court is doing no more than fashioning and applying
a rule of evidence. The Court holds only that the certificate of the
State Department cannot generally be impeached with parol evidence. This holding rests in part upon "deference" to the executive
branch, but also upon considerations of policy identical to those
underlying similar parol evidence rules. For example, the verdict
of a jury as rendered and recorded in open court is well-nigh conclusive and may not be impeached by parol except in unusual and
limited circumstances.9 1 The promotion of certainty and the honoring of reliances brought into being by the State Department's
practice and, as well, independently justifiable, supports the Baiz
rule.
In the same vein is Field v. Clark,92 in which the Court refused to go behind the signatures of the Speaker of the House
of Representatives and the President of the Senate on a bill, and
to consider a claim that the bill as passed by the Congress differed
from that enrolled and signed by the President and Speaker. The
Court stated that it would reflect a lack of respect for a coequal
department if it were not to "accept, as having passed Congress,
all bills authenticated" in this manner.98
Field v. Clark and In re Baiz, though commonly called "political question" cases, do not, therefore, involve a refusal to decide.
Moreover, the Court has recognized that deference and not surrender is involved in fashioning rules of evidence when political
considerations are at stake. Most clearly in the law of privilege it
has said "[jiudicial control over the evidence in a case cannot be
abdicated to the caprice of executive officers." 9 4
90 The precedents are collected and discussed in Hellenic Lines, Ltd. v. Moore,
345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965). See also United States ex tel. Casanova v. Fitzpatrick, 214 F. Supp. 425 (S.D.N.Y. 1963). The "evidentiary" character of the certificate is illustrated by Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 28 F. Supp. 958,
972 (S.D.N.Y. 1939), aff'd, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940), holding that if the diplomat
chooses not to invoke his immunity, for example to testify in a case, he may do so.
The question whether the waiver was improper is between him and his government.
The immunity, of course, belongs to the government in question, and may be
waived by it. Id.
91 8 J. WIGMORE, EVMENCE § 2348 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
92 143 U.S. 649 (1892).
93 Id. at 672.
94 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1 "(1953). See 8 J. WIGmORE, EVIDENCei
§ 2379(g), at 808-10 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), noting that in England the decision as to whether the privilege for official information exists is for a political
minister, while in this country the decision is the court's. Wigmore approves the
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C. Cases Involving the ConstitutionalCommitment to Other Agencies of Power to Issue Individually-Addressed Commands
Another class of what might be termed "political question"
cases are those involving a constitutionally-based commitment of
the power to issue "occasional or particular" commands to another
branch of government than the judiciary. The trial of impeachments by the Senate may be an example,95 and in Powell v. McCormack 96 the respondents earnestly contended that determinations as
to the seating of representatives were of such a nature. The issue
has arisen in other contexts, however. The Congress is given the
power to provide for the governance of the land and naval forces,
which may involve giving courts martial and other agencies the
power to issue binding commands directed to individuals. The flourishing growth of administrative tribunals vested with such power
is similarly an exercise of congressional power which may, it has
been argued, permit the Congress to foreclose the judiciary from
interfering with agencies thus created. As to military tribunals, the
claim of constitutional withdrawal from courts of the power to decide has been faced and resolved in favor of review on habeas
corpus, and lately through the injunctive power.9 7 And the Court
has carefully limited the sphere within which courts martial, rather
than article three courts, may issue commands at all. 8 Administrative agencies, even those whose determinations are made "final"
by statute, find the Court superintending them with a hint that the
Constitution compels judicial review. 99 The operation of "separation of powers" logic in such cases measures the deference given
to the determinations of military and administrative bodies, and
American rule: "A court which abdicates its inherent function of determining the
facts upon which the admissibility of evidence depends will furnish to bureaucratic
officials too ample opportunities for abusing the privilege. . . . Both principle and
policy demand that the determination of the privilege shall be for the court." See
also Cambell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (Sth Cir. 1962); Zimmerman v. Poindexter,
74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Hawaii 1947). Governmental claims of privilege are routinely
overruled when the personal liberty of a litigant is in issue. See Alderman v. United
States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969); Dennis v. United States, 384 U.S. 855 (1966); Roviaro
v. United States, 353 U.S. 53 (1957); United States v. Coplon, 185 F.2d 629 (2d
Cir. 1950); Zimmerman v. Poindexter, 74 F. Supp. 933 (D. Hawaii 1947).
95 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 6-7. Since the judgment in such a case would
not extend to a restraint upon personal liberty, habeas corpus might not be available.
96 395 U.S. 486 (1969), discussed in Comments on Powell v. McCormack 17
U.C.L.A. L. Rav. 1 (1969).
97 See United States ex rel. Creary v. Weeks, 259 U.S. 336 (1922); Comment,
Investigative Procedures in the Military: A Search for Absolutes, 53 CALi'. L. Rav.
878 (1965).
98 O'Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258 (1969).
99 Estep v. United States, 327 U.S. 114, 119-20 (1946). HART & WECHSLER,
supra note 8, at 340, interpret Estep as saying that "jurisdiction always is jurisdiction
only to decide constitutionally."
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does not signify a general and discretionary invocation of a barrier
to decision. Looking more broadly at the cases in which a constitutional basis is sought for the assertion that the final power to
issue individually-addressed commands resides elsewhere than the
judiciary, the determination of the constitutional issue thus tendered is made by the Court on a basis applicable not to a class of
issues or problems, but on the basis of the legally-demonstrable
competence of the non-judicial body. These cases may involve some
of the same kinds of separation of powers considerations as do
cases such as Oetjen or cases such as Baiz, but they involve the
making of an entirely different sort of determination.
D.

The "Republican Form of Government" Cases: A Hybrid

The "republican form of government" cases are difficult to
explain, particularly in light of Justice Frankfurter's analysis of
the guaranty clause in the reapportionment cases.' 00 The text should
be the starting point for analysis:
The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a
Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them
against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic
Violence.' 0 '

One ought, in analyzing the clause, to begin by inquiring
what structures and practices of government are uniquely safeguarded by it.'0 Many attributes of the "republican form of government" are safeguarded by provisions of the Bill of Rights applicable to the states, among them the free speech and free press
guarantee. The thirteenth, fourteenth and fifteenth amendments,
and the Reconstruction legislation in aid of them, contain, as both
the Colegrove majority and the Baker v. Carr majority would have
agreed, 10 provisions which are designed to foster and extend republican institutions. When we consider the guaranty clause in
isolation from other guarantees of rights bound up with republican
institutions, therefore, we address a rather narrow class of cases. 4
100 Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549 (1946) (opinion'of Frankfurter, J.) ; Baker
v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962). Frankfurter begins with the broad proposition
that guaranty clause cases are nonjusticiable, and argues as well that cases involving
"political" as distinct from "personal" rights are not justiciable. The former assertion is discussed in the text below. The latter assertion rests simply upon a judgment
as to whether one who claims his vote has been "debased" has been harmed in a
way which the law of remedies can notice.
101 U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 4.
102 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 241-50 (1962) (Douglas, J., concurring).
103 Frankfurter impliedly conceded in Colegrove that the "white primary" cases
were rightly decided. 328 U.S. at 552.
104 In addition to Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Baker, cited in note
102 supra, see, e.g., Bond v. Floyd, 385 U.S. 116 (1966).
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Luther v. Borden'0 5 was a trespass case, the plaintiff claiming
under the rebel government of Rhode Island, and the defendant
claiming under the "established" or "charter" government. The
plaintiff asserted that the charter government was not "republican"
and that the rebels had de facto control of the subject property at
the time the cause of action arose. The Court held the question not
subject to judicial resolution, and upheld a dismissal of the plaintiff's suit. The Court's opinion rests upon its finding that Congress
has the power to decide which government of a state to recognize,
and that the "political" department had sole authority to determine
whether the guaranty clause was appropriate to be invoked. There
is some textual support for the latter assertion in the language of
the clause, and the decisions are explicable as holding that the
Constitution commits the decision-the issuance or nonissuance of
an occasional or particular command-to another branch, at least
insofar as the command is thought of as issued to a state or government as an entity. Of course, the command or decision, though
so addressed, will almost surely have collateral consequences upon
individuals in the state, and as to them will be a generally-addressed
command.
True, the Court in Baker v. Carr sought to include "lack of
criteria by which a court could determine which form of government was republican"'0 6 among the grounds of decision in Luther.
There is no textual support in the Luther opinion for such an assertion, and "lack of criteria" is, in any event, only another way
of saying that the interpretation of the guaranty clause would present a question of first impression.
Georgia v. Stanton,"°7 an attempt to invoke the judicial power
against reconstruction, failed also, the Court holding that the legislation in question amounted to a judgment that Georgia did not
have a republican form of government and required intervention
of federal authority to establish one.
None of the cases goes so far as to say that every question
arising out of an executive or congressional assertion of power
under the guaranty clause is beyond judicial review. If in the course
of its action the Executive should imprison some recalcitrant state
official, his right to sue in habeas corpus is not drawn into question
by any interpretation of the guaranty clause. 0 8 And the "republi105 48 U.S. (7 How.) 1 (1849).
106 369 U.S. at 222. Compare id. at n.48.
107 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
108 Although the Court yielded to the Congress in Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S.
(7 Wall.) 506 (1868), and held that it had validly been deprived of appellate jurisdiction in a habeas corpus case, in Ex parte Yerger, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 85 (1868) it
did not. Indeed, the Court's earlier decision in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.)
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can form of government" cases do not, as Justice Douglas has
pointed out, foreclose even quite sweeping judicial review of the
exercise of executive power when such exercise is claimed to
threaten other rights guaranteed by the Federal Constitution, laws
and treaties. 0 9
There have not been enough "political question" cases under
the guaranty clause to permit a conclusion broader than this: the
clause uniquely governs a narrow class of cases and the decisions
construing the clause hold it to establish both that the political
department may issue certain sorts of individually-addressed and
certain forms of generally-addressed commands. There is no judicial power to compel the issuance of the generally-addressed command, just as there is no such power to compel the issuance of any
other sort of generally-addressed command.1 0 And there is no reason to doubt that a decision to invoke the clause is reviewable,
although one must concede that the matter is far from settled.
E.

Immunity of the President's Person
Mississippi v. Johnson,"' often termed a "political question"
case," 2 held that President Andrew Johnson could not be sued.
Though the case also involved a "guaranty clause issue," the President's immunity may perhaps be termed a "political question."
To make this concession does not admit a generalized judicial power
to abstain from deciding certain sorts of issues.
First, the President is not immune from all process of any sort,
or at least there is quite respectable authority for saying so."'
2 (1866) affirms as well the Court's power in habeas corpus. See HART & WECHrSLER
supra note 8, at 292 n.1.
109 See Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Baker, 369 U.S. at 241-50; note
108 supra.
110 That is, there is no power to compel the Congress to pass a law respecting
interstate commerce, although it has power to do so. Had the Congress never legislated in this field, it is difficult to imagine a Court ordering it either to get busy
and think about the problem or to pass some particular law at the behest of a
particular plaintiff. While it is true that this notion of judicial power rests ultimately
upon a hard-to-justify distinction between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance," there is
a sense in which our entire legal system rests upon such a notion. The notion that
plaintiffs have the burden of proof, and the extensive case law defining and protecting the "status quo ante" the litigation, are expressive of this concept. See Cleary,
Presuming and Pleading: An Essay on Juristic Immaturity, 12 STAN. L. REV. 5 (1959).
Ill 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 475 (1866). It is surely not remarkable that a great deal
of the political question law was made during and immediately after the Civil War,
by a Court constituted as a pro-North institution.
112 See, e.g., Justice Frankfurter's Colegrove opinion, 328 U.S. at 556.
113 See United States v. Burr, 25 F. Cas. 30, 34-35. (C.C.D. Va. 1807). Chief
Justice Marshall demolished the claim of the President to a plenary immunity from
process. Marshall indicated that the President may be liable to produce documents
under subpoena, and to have his deposition taken, although his personal appearance
at a trial might be excused due to the burdens of office.
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Second, and more important, as to almost any question on which
one might wish to sue the President there will generally be some
subordinate official who can be reached. 114
F.

The "Modern" View of the Political Question Doctrine
In sum, the "political question doctrine" does not seem to be
a doctrine at all, but a group of quite different legal rules and principles, each resting in part upon deference to the political branches
of government. Such an assertion, however, while setting forth a
characteristic of the political question cases, does not uniquely describe them. The idea of deference to coordinate branches is evident
in a number of other contexts as well, such as in assessing the
constitutionality of statutes. The general assertion that a political
question is one which courts should not decide because they do not
wish to enter the "political thicket" is, therefore, meaningless. Its
invention, in the perhaps worthy service of integrating a disparate
collection of precedent, has served in subsequent cases to becloud
the issue which the. Court must confront when deciding not to decide. It is no doubt healthy that the doctrine, in the broad form
stated by Mr. Justice Frankfurter in Colegrove v. Green, has not
found a majority willing to press it to the limits suggested by
Frankfurter's definition. However, the notion has persisted, despite
the results in Baker v. Carr and Powell v. McCormack, perhaps
in part because of the vague and general "test" for political questions set out in those cases, that there is a means for the Court to
avoid deciding any case or issue upon the basis of a broad, highly
general, and almost entirely discretionary principle of nondecision.
This view is of course subject to the same criticisms which may
be made of Professor Bickel's apothesis of the passive virtues.
With the above discussion as background, one can see in particular why the Brennan formulation in Baker v. Carr represents
an unsatisfactory effort to rationalize a collection of disparate precedent. Consider the various elements of the Brennan "test." The
first of the stated grounds, "textually demonstrable constitutional
commitment,""' 5 is in accord with a group of the precedents, although the phrase uncritically lumps together commitments of power
114 E.g., the Attorney General when it is sought to reach some practice of
his
department, as in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963) ; or the Secretary of State, as in Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500 (1964). In a
related context, Justice Frankfurter remarked that to approve a legal theory under
which no officer of government could be reached with process in a given case would
be to approve a "fox-hunting theory of justice that ought to make Bentham's skeleton rattle." United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen, 340 U.S. 462, 473 (1951) (concurring opinion).
115 369 U.S. at 217.
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to make individually-addressed and generally-addressed commands.
The second, "lack of judicially discoverable and manageable standards,"116 is not the mark of a political question, but appears to
restate the principle of ripeness and the equity principle that the
chancellor cannot intervene where the dispute will not permit the
entry of a judicially-manageable mandatory decree. The "impossibility of deciding without an initial policy determination of a
kind clearly for nonjudicial discretion ' 1 7 rationale is meaningless
except as a restatement of the doctrine of "exhaustion of administrative remedies" or ripeness, for it assumes the existence of a
nonjudicial body with the power to decide initially and appears to
require that that body's decision be obtained in the first instance.
The only application of this rationale not analyzable in ripeness
or exhaustion terms would be one in which there was no way for
the litigant against whom the political question doctrine was invoked to obtain the required preliminary determination. In cases
in which "political question" means that some coordinate branch
has the power to issue generally-addressed commands, that department usually cannot be compelled to issue such a command. To
take another illustration, the State Department, when its view as
to recognition of a foreign government or some other question of
policy is important, has at times been less than clear about its
position. 1 8 There is no means to compel the Department to come
up with a clearer answer, and the courts have solved this question by either trying to guess at the Department's position, or by
going on to decide the matter independently, sometimes in clear
recognition that. waiting for the Department would be futile and
a possible departure from the judicial obligation to decide." 9
Such an instance of the "preliminary decision" rationale elides
with the next Baker justification for the political question doctrine,
"the impossibility of the court's undertaking independent resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches
of government."' 2 Unless this rationalization is designed to express
in another way the principle that some commands, general and particular, are left to the coordinate branches of government to be
116 Id.
117 Id.
118 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 196-97, discussing some far-fetched
judicial attempts to divine the State Department's intentions. Banco Nacional de Cuba
v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 420 (1964), & particularly note 19 and the accompanying
text, discusses judicial deference to Executive Department determinations in the
field of extranational recognition of judgments. See also the discussion in Hellenic
Lines, Ltd. v. Moore, 345 F.2d 978 (D.C. Cir. 1965).
119 HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 196-97.
120 369 U.S. at 217.
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framed in final form, it has no support in the cases and provides
no definable guide to decision. What conceivably can "lack of respect" mean, as a principle of decision, to a Court which decided
Marbury or the Steel Seizure Case? The criterion "unusual need
for adherence to a political decision already made,"' 2 to the
extent it reflects the cases, speaks to the question of commitment
of a decision to another branch.
The final Baker test, "the potentiality of embarrassment from
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question,"' 22 has not been used in the older cases as an independent
basis for invoking the political question doctrine, but as a spur to
finding that the question in issue had been committed to another
branch for decision in one of the senses described above. There
have, indeed, been cases involving the most delicate questions of
foreign relations in which executive action by officers acting within
the scope of their duties has been condemned by the Court,'2 8 and
the condemnation made the basis of an occasional or particular
24
command that the damage done by the officers be redressed.
It is appropriate, too, at this point, to note another stated justification for invoking the political question doctrine, first set out
in an article by Professor Scharpf "2 , and adopted by a distinguished
district judge.' 26 Scharpf states that "difficulties of access to information ' 'a 7 may provide a justification for not deciding. While it
is true that "political question" cases, particularly those involving
the guaranty clause and foreign relations, involve issues as to which
fact-gathering is difficult, this does not at all justify invocation of
a barrier to decision. A less drastic remedy will suffice. The difficulties which the adversary system has in reconstructing past events
tend, as a review of the cases shows, to be resolved by familiar
rules of evidence which fall generally into three categories: allocation of the burden of going forward,'12 8 allocation of the risk of
nonpersuasion, 12 9 and parol evidence rules.' 8 0 These rules may rest
121

122

Id.

Id.

See, e.g., Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); The Paquete
Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
124 The Paquete Habana is an example.
123

125

Scharpf, supra note 2.

126

United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511, 515, 520 (D. Mass. 1968)

127 Scharpf, supra note 2, at 567.
128 See the discussion in Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165 (1969),

of
the defendant's burden of going forward and the government's burden of proof in
a case involving unlawful electronic surveillance.
129 In the field of conflicts of law involving a foreign law the American courts
have persisted in applying the absurd rule that the foreign law must be pleaded
and proved by the party relying upon it. See A. EHBENZWEiG, CONFLICT oF LAWS
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in part as we have seen in, the discussion of, for example, In re
Baiz, upon considerations of deference to a "political branch" of
government. They may also rest, as does the presumption of regularity' 8 1-the presumption that an official duty was lawfully performed-upon related reasons of extrinsic policy.3 2 They also rest
upon an assessment of the probabilities inherent in the situations
to which they address themselves: the assumption that an official
record is accurate, or that the officer who attests that a certain
thing is so is acting within the scope of his authority.3 3 But the
application of these rules has always been tempered with the understanding that to the extent they are shortcuts to finding the
truth in a majority of cases, they may be discarded when they are
shown to impede that process.' 3 4 To the extent that these rules
reflect considerations of deference to political branches or reflect
judgments about other matters of extrinsic policy, they give way
in the face of countervailing considerations of individual legal
right.
G.

Concluding General Observations

The foregoing analysis seeks to demonstrate that neither a
reading of the "political question" cases themselves, nor an earnest attempt to understand restatements of "political question" law,
permits one to say that there is a coherent, single principle which
permits or requires non-decision of an identifiable class of cases. We
do see that "political question" cases rest in some measure upon
§ 127 (1962). Otherwise, the court may assume the foreign law to be the same as the
domestic law. While this rule may be ridiculous, the notion that the difficulties of
finding out what is the state of affairs in a foreign country (Scharpf's reason for
applying the political question doctrine to foreign relations cases) should be resolved by allocating the burden of proof is not. See Walton v. Arabian-American Oil
Co., 233 F.2d 541 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 872 (1956).
180 See notes 88-94 supra and accompanying text.
131 The "presumption of regularity" crops up in many contexts to help the
government show that official duty was lawfully performed. Selective service cases
are filled with discussions of the presumption: e.g., Greer v. United States, 378 F.2d
931, 933 (5th Cir. 1967). For a more general discussion, see my treatment of the
problem in SEL. SERv. L. REP., Practice Manual f 2404, at 1148 n.7.
182 See Wigmore's discussion of the parol evidence rule relating to the verdict
of a jury, 8 J. WimoE, EVIDENCE § 2348 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961), and the
more general discussion of the parol evidence rule in 9 J. WiGmoRE, EVIDENCE §§
2400-78 (3d ed. 1940).
183 For an application of this assumption, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 44. For a more
general discussion of the principle that an official record, taken as a whole, is proof
that the things there recorded, and only those, took place, see 5 J. WIo ORE, EvIDENCE § 1633, at 519 (3d ed. 1940).
184 United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 174 F. Supp. 233, 237 (D.N.J.

19S9): "[T]his presumption or [sic] regularity . . . is effective, like other presumptions of fact, only in the absence of evidence to the contrary."
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deference to coordinate branches, but we see that other sorts of
cases do also. We do not see in the law of political questions an
authority to refuse to decide any given issue always, at all times,
and by whomever raised. This assertion does not, of course, answer the problem entirely. That there is no general principle of
non-decision which meets all the cases to which the wit of judges
and ordinary men would seek to apply it does not tend inevitably
to the conclusion that there are no cases, or no class of cases, in
which non-decision is appropriate. The field of foreign relations is
one in which the foregoing analysis may fruitfully be tested, not because such a test will finally determine the worth of the analysis,
but because it is a political question arena of some importance.
III. AMERICAN MILITARY INVOLVEMENT

AS A POLITICAL QUESTION

None of the authority commonly cited by those who oppose
a judicial consideration of American military involvement abroad
suggests that there is no judicial power respecting foreign relations,
or that the view of the United States government upon questions of
international law is for the President finally to decide. Rather, the
foreign relations-international law cases demonstrate that the judiciary will determine the sphere within which the Executive and
the Congress, or the two of them jointly, have authority within
the constitutional system, and will defer to competent exercises
of that authority to issue both general and particular commands.
To be sure, there are judicial expressions of hesitancy about
the power to decide foreign relations issues. Often quoted is a dictum in Marbury v. Madison:
If some acts be examinable, and others not, there must be some
rule of law to guide the court in the exercise of its jurisdiction.
In some instances there may be difficulty in applying the rule to
particular cases; but there cannot, it is believed, be much difficulty
in laying down the rule.
By the Constitution of the United States, the President is invested with certain important political powers, in the exercise of
which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable only to his
country in his political character, and to his own conscience. To aid
him in the performance of these duties, he is authorized to appoint
certain officers, who act by his authority and in conformity with his
orders.
In such cases, their acts are his icts; and whatever opinion may
be entertained of the manner in which executive discretion may be
used, still there exists, and can exist, no power to control that discretion. The subjects are political. They respect the nation, not individual
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rights, and being entrusted to the executive, the decision of the executive is conclusive. The application of this remark will be perceived
by adverting to the act of congress for establishing the department
of foreign affairs. This officer, as his duties were prescribed by that
act, is to conform precisely to the will of the President. He is the
mere organ by whom that will is communicated. The acts of such an
officer, as an officer, can never be examinable by the courts. 135

A close reading of this statement reveals that it does not purport to exclude all questions of foreign relations from judicial cognizance, but only certain functions of the Secretary of State. The
evidentiary privilege for official information-the "executive privilege"I'3 -reflects this concern, as do the parol evidence rule cases
such as In re Baiz, and the deference paid to State Department
declarations in other foreign relations contexts. It has been held,
along this line, that a spy cannot sue for his wages on a contract
to commit espionage; 13 7 not because the Court will refuse to decide
such cases, but because a part of every such contract is an understanding that litigation upon it is at best a breach of good faith. By
bringing his suit alleging the contract exists, the plaintiff pleads
himself out of court. The President's power respecting foreign relations has also been invoked in cases upholding his power to make
an occasional or particular command, even one with great economic
consequences, as in the Curtiss-Wright Export Case.18
These isolated and celebrated cases give a distorted view of
the role of the federal courts, particularly the Supreme Court, in
fashioning and applying principles of international law in the sphere
of American foreign relations. A closer analysis of the cases is required.
To begin, there is an arena in which the judiciary claims complete sway. When neither the Executive nor the Congress has acted,
and when the Court finds no commitment of the power to decide
in the first instance to either of these branches, it will apply rules
of written and customary international law to the settlement of
disputes between private persons."3 These rules may be derived
from treaties. 4 0 They may also be derived from customary interna135 9 U.S. (1 Cranch) i37, 165-66 (1803).
188 The "executive privilege," "narrowly confined to cases involving the national
security," Cambell v. Eastland, 307 F.2d 478 (5th Cir. 1962), is extensively discussed in 8 J. WIOmoax, EVrDENCE §§ 2367-79 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961).
137 Totten v. United States, 92 U.S. 105 (1875).
188 United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936), contains
a sweeping statement of the President's power in the field of foreign relations which

is not borne out by the cases and not necessary to the decision in that case.
189 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
140 U.S. CONST. art. M,

§ 2.
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tional law.' 4 1 The admiralty jurisdiction involves federal courts in
the latter sort of lawmaking.' 42 But even without express article
three warrant, the Court has concluded that the federal judiciary
is empowered to find and apply rules of customary international
law in the same way that a common law court finds and applies
municipal rules of decision. 4 3 While considerations of federalism
have since Erie R. R. v. Tompkins144 kept the federal courts away
from such lawmaking with respect to municipal legal rules, its authority in the international sphere is undoubted. Indeed, the case
which Erie overruled, Swift v. Tyson,1 45 rested upon a theoretical
foundation which brought that case within the ambit of federal
courts' common law power upon the basis of considerations not
unlike those whch motivate it in the international law field. Swift
was a commercial law case, and Justice Story's opinion reflects the
view that commercial law was, as it had been since the praetor
peregrinus of Roman times and until a late date in English legal
to the class of merhistory, a species of jus gentium pertaining
14
chants without regard to nationality.
Rules of international law may be applied by the Supreme
Court with respect to certain transnational disputes in the formulation of rules concerning recognition of extranational judgments and
decrees, 47 and in the formulation of choice of law rules in transnational controversies. 48
The Court has also not retired from the field when the Executive or Congress claims that the formulation of a general or
occasional command with respect to foreign relations is within its
competence. It has reached and decided the merits, in the face of a
"Cwar power" claim, in the Japanese Relocation Cases, 49 and in
141
142
L. REV.
143

The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
See generally Stolz, Pleasure Boating and Admiralty: Erie at Sea, 51 CALM.
661 (1963).
The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
144 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
145 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842).
146 See id. at 19, for Justice Story's discussion of the international character of

the commercial law. It was the reluctance of the common law courts to apply law
merchant principles that led to the early expansion of the equity jurisdiction in
England and the establishment of commercial courts to serve the class of merchants
and traders. See T. PLUCKNETT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COmmON LAW, 604-35
(2d ed. 1936). As to the Roman Law, see Comment, Automatic Extinction of CrossDemands: Compensatio from Rome to California, 53 CALIF. L. REv. 224, 228 (1965).
147 Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
148 See A. EHRENZWEIO, PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW § 9 (1967).
149 Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United
States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943).
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the Steel Seizure Case,150 to give two examples. The deference displayed in these cases is just that-deference, not surrender, a
deference that is rooted in the notion of separate and equal branches
of government and that precedes a decision on the merits as to
whether the Constitution gives the Executive the power he claimed
to have. Decisions that consider the dangers of the nation speaking
with two voices in foreign affairs do not use the language of abdication but of decision that the scheme of separation of powers
validates the claim that the Executive has the power to decide which
he claims to have. 51
Consider now the case of American involvement in Indochina.
First, it is claimed by opponents of the war that the President has
exceeded his constitutional authority in sending vast numbers of
American troops to another country to fight without a congressional authorization for him to do so. 152 Interestingly, it is also
claimed that the process of conscripting those troops is unlawful, 153
but no one has suggested that the courts do not have the power to
decide this issue, or ought not, in the exercise of some presumed
discretion, decide it; this though the impact of an adverse decision
on the merits of the exercise by the President of his powers would
be incalculable.
It is also claimed by opponents of the American involvement
in Indochina that our participation involves violation of treaties
to which the United States is a party, which define certain acts,
whether committed by nations or by individuals, as crimes against
international law.1 54 Some of these treaties have been interpreted
to consider in mitigation, but not in exoneration, that an individual
was under orders to do the conduct denounced as criminal. 55
Third, it is claimed that American participation in Indochina
may involve this country in violation of rules of customary international law regulating the conduct of warfare 56
One may quickly see that litigation of these issues might pre150 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), discussed in
HART & WECHSLER,

supra note 8, at 1200-12.

151 See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964); Oetjen v.
Central Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918) ; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
152 See SEL. SERV. L. REP., Practice Manual
2329, at 1140 and authorities
there cited.
153 See Friedman, Conscription and the Constitution: The Original Understanding, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1493 (1969).
154 See generally SEL. SERV. L. REP., Practice Manual T 2326-33 at 1138-42.
See also Mora v. McNamara, 389 U.S. 934 (1967); Mitchell v. United States, 386
U.S. 972 (1967)
155 Id.
158

Id.

(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
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sent the following questions: whether government officials or those
acting in concert with them are violating international law; whether
the United States Government is violating such law; and whether
the executive branch has trespassed upon some constitutional obligation which it owes to the people generally. These issues raise
in turn procedural difficulties which might stand in the way of a
court deciding the merits, as well as the question whether one of
the particular political question principles may be invoked as a
barrier to judicial decision.
Consider, first, the case of a civil plaintiff seeking a declaratory judgment and injunction against executive officers, and alleging each of the three general grounds mentioned above. While a
suit against the President might be barred by doctrines peculiar
to the Presidential office, suits against subordinate officers of government would not face the same difficulty. The first issues to be
confronted would be those of constitutional standing, ripeness in
the constitutional sense and the requisite adversity-the article
three requirements. These are not issues peculiar to so-called "political" questions. A court might well decide that the plaintiff lacked
standing with respect to his international law claims, both because
such claims are arguably properly raised only by nations which
are offended by unlawful behavior of other nations, 157 and because
to the extent that individuals are affected, those individuals are
Indochinese and not Americans. With respect to other international
law claims, arising under the "individual responsibility" treaties,
the court might well question the plaintiff's standing to sue in the
sense that it did not appear that he is being asked to violate international law. The ripeness issue might be raised in the sense
that the case lacked sufficient development of the factual and legal
basis of the alleged harm to be a "case and controversy."
Again, the court might regard the case as inappropriate for
decision upon some nonconstitutional ground, including nonconstitutional ripeness of the kind discussed above, or upon the basis
that an injunction would tax the administrative powers of an equity
court beyond their wonted limits. Were the plaintiff to overcome
these hurdles, he would have the burden of going forward and the
risk of non-persuasion and might find it difficult to meet a burden
of establishing his case by the required quantum of evidence. There
are justifications for insisting upon a heavy burden of proof. And
since the executive decisions in question would in the typical injunction or declaratory judgment suit be challenged not as occasional or particular commands but as general decisions of policy,
157

See L. Oi~nEL

& E. RE, INTERNATiONAL LAW 177-79 (2d ed. 1965).
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the deference due judgments about "legislative fact," would be
among the considerations called into play by the Executive in
defending the case. But, "what if?" What if the Court should find
it necessary to find, if it were to inquire about the merits, that the
war was somehow "illegal?" It seems to me at that point that the
Court cannot upon any principle finding root in the constitutional
system of rules evade its obligation to decide.
Cries of dissent from this view may be based upon several
grounds. Some viewers of the Court would question the wisdom of
the Court arrogating to itself such power, upon general principles
similar to those invoked by Professor Bickel. But in considering
such complaints, one ought to consider as well the enormous power
which the Constitution commits to the executive branch with respect to military and foreign affairs matters, and ask what if any
checks the framers could have intended to provide. Patrick Henry
expressed concern on this score in the debates on ratification:
If your American chief be a man of ambition and abilities, how
easy is it for him to render himself absolute! The army is in his
hands, and if he be a man of address, it will be attached to him, and
it will be the subject of long meditation with him to seize the first
auspicious moment to accomplish his design; and, sir, will the American spirit solely relieve you when this happens? I would rather
infinitely-and I am sure most of this Convention are of the same
opinion-have a King, Lords, and Commons, than a government so
replete with such insupportable evils. If we make a King, we may
prescribe the rules by which he shall rule his people, and interpose
such checks as shall prevent him from infringing them; but the President, in the field, at the head of his army, can prescribe the terms on
which he shall reign master, so far that it will puzzle any American
ever to get his neck from under the galling yoke. I cannot with
patience think of this idea. If ever he violates the laws, one of two
things will happen: he shall come at the head of his army, to carry
everything before him;158or he will give bail, or do what Mr. Chief
Justice will order him.

There are also those who argue that the Court should not
"become involved" because its decision might be disregarded. 59
Would not the judgment of the Court against the war be a confession, they urge, of its own inability to change the course of events
to which its decision is addressed? Such worries seem to me illconceived, although upon a premise that may evoke dissent from
some. Earlier in this article I discussed Dred Scott, and concluded
that the Court, in deciding that case, fulfilled its duty to chart the
limits upon the power of the constitutional compact, and therefore
158
159

Quoted in 1 DOCUMENTS
Bickel so argues.

OF AMERICAN HISTORY 147 (H. Commager

ed.

1944).
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of the existing system of positive law, to accommodate the growing
demand for abolition. There were those, of course, justice Grier
and President Buchanan among them, who believed that Dred
Scott would set at rest the controversy about slavery. But that to
one side, I would contend that Dred Scott is a classic case of the
Court upholding what the existence of a written constitution necessarily implies: that agencies of government must when pressed
give a reason for behaving as they do, and that when the agency
of government which is the last resort of the victim of some alleged
governmental misconduct has spoken in such terms, the populace
is given a choice between abiding by the authoritative decision
thus made, or of altering the frame of government to accommodate
its demands.
This argument assumes that the Constitution assigns spheres
of competence to departments of government and to the electorate.
It assumes that the only one of these agencies with the conceded
power to act upon the basis of no identifiable principle is the electorate. The alternative amounts, it seems to me, to an insistence
upon absolutism. By absolutism, I do not mean the assertion within
a particular ambit of the power to make discretionary decisions:
such power may be saved from a claim that it is unlimited if the
power-wielder recognizes or is made to recognize that his discretion
extends only to particular matters committed to him by legal rules
which he can identify, or that his discretion as to particular matters may be checked if he passes certain bounds even within that
ambit.16 o
The notion that the Constitution establishes these spheres of
competence is basic to the notion of a written constitution, representing as it does the crystalizing out of legal rules and principles
upon the basis of the social conditions of 1787. This notion is also
reflected in the case law of "political questions," which as we have
160 Jaffe, Standing to Secure Judicial Review: Public Actions, 74 HARv. L. REv.
1265, 1303 (1961), states that there are areas of public life which are rule-free,
either because of a decision that the actor is better left without a rule to guide him,
or that a rule is only one among a number of considerations. Surely what Professor
Jaffe means is something like that set out in the sentence above: an area or discretion
to make commands, subject to correction for abuse and subject to limitation to ensure the actor keeps within it. It seems to me that while Chicago & Southern Air
Lines, Inc. v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948), holding that a Presidential
international air route award is not subject to judicial review, is explicable as a
case holding that the President is confided with power to make certain types of occasional or particular commands, it is not rightly decided. Better, it seems, to
recognize that insofar as the President was exerting his power over foreign relations
in his decision, his discretion is unreviewable. But if the foreign relations questions
can be shown to be out of the case, then review seems proper.
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seen is not unprincipled law but based upon a judicial determination of the powers of the departments of government.
The Court can evade the impact of this argument, it seems to
me, only by deciding that the Executive is committed with the final
authority to make decisions about war and peace which, at least
as they take the form of general commands not addressed to a
particular plaintiff-as in our declaratory judgment and injunction
case-are not reviewable. This decision, which would follow one
line of political question authority, would have some support, although meager, in principle, at least up to the point that the
President, for example, said that he had the power to declare war
and that Congress had no such power. The last case would be distinguishable as being too clear to permit argument that the President was not misreading the constitutional compact. But in all cases
save this one, we would know the limits to which the rule of law
will carry us in the conduct of war, and that is a judgment which
the article three courts, if we assume away all the principled bases
of non-decision discussed above, have the duty to make.
This duty arises from the words of article three itself, which
speaks of "cases" and "controversies" within certain limits and raising certain kinds of issues. And if in a given case there be no
statutory limit on the Court's jurisdiction, and if there be no demonstrable commitment of the decision to another branch, and if
there be no more chance of postponing decision for another day
upon some consideration of, say, ripeness, from whence derives the
determination not to answer the legal question the plaintiff asks?
I do not mean to foreclose the question whether the Constitution
commits the decision in such a case to another branch, but only to
suggest that the case law of the "political question" doctrine, and
the concept of judicial review implicit in Marbury, requires that it
be answered.
Let me suggest an argument that the decisions concerning
the conduct of warfare are not the Executive's alone. The argument rests upon the acknowledged power of the Court to find and
apply rules of international law and to probe into questions involving foreign relations when those questions involve considerations of private right. I also suggest that it will turn upon an.
assessment of the importance, in the constitutional scheme, of some
check upon the executive's control of the military, and of the constitutional commitment to the Congress of the power to declare war.
At this point, when deciding who should decide, rather than at
the point of making up out of whole cloth discretionary principles
of non-decision, must the weight of "separation of powers" argu-
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ments be measured. It it true that the Framers believed we should
speak with one voice on these questions, no matter whose voice
that turned out to be? Or is it more likely that the constitutional
document is the more honored by the view that the successive
consideration by all the councils of the nation should be available?' 6 ' And if the seriousness of these questions has not led the
Court to postpone, avoid, or defer decision upon some ground generally applicable to constitutional cases, then, taking it as given
by this preliminary "decision to decide" that some concern of private right is inevitably involved, in which a decision one way will
adversely affect an interest the law recognizes in the general run
of cases, there is evidence that the Court was intended to have
the power to delimit the sphere of executive discretion by imposing
limits not only as to the matters on which he might decide, but 1 as
62
to the content of the decisions he might make within these bounds.
One would, that is, require some more explicit evidence than the
document offers of a constitutional commitment of the power to
decide in any way whatever before holding that the Court may not
inquire into the propriety of executive action. Not only is such
evidence lacking, but the cases in which the Court has reached and
decided questions of foreign relations, even those involving the "war
power," point in the opposite direction. Just. as there is no "political question" doctrine in the broad, unprincipled sense urged
by some, so there is no "war power" in the sense of a generalized
grant of authority to the executive branch. The text of the Constitution, with its detailed description of the powers of the Congress
over foreign and military affairs, 6 3 the Federalist papers, with
their discussion of the principles back of this enumeration, 164 and
the case law' 65 militate against the claim that there is a "war
power."
Consider now, as an alternative, the case not of a civil plaintiff, but of a criminal defendant or habeas corpus litigant. What
of a selective service registrant who seeks to challenge the legality
of the war in which he is conscripted to fight, who refuses induction and thereby makes himself subject to criminal prosecution?
And what, in the same breath, of the soldier who refuses an order
to get on a ship bound for a war the legality of which he challenges,
161 See SEL. SERv. L. REP., Practice Manual 1 2329 at 1140.
162 See generally WECHSLER, supra note 5, at 4-15; HART & WECHSLER, supra
note 8, at 312-40.
163 I refer here to the detailed breakdown in article one of the war-making and
army-raising power given to Congress, and the relatively limited grant of authority
to the Executive in article two.
164 THE FEDERALIST Nos. 24-29 (A. Hamilton).
165 See, e.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
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or who is prosecuted for failure to obey an order to shoot a civilian,
and who seeks habeas corpus review of his court martial conviction?
Perhaps in some of these cases non-constitutional ripeness
poses an issue whether there is a threat of imminent harm to the
claimant. One might question in the case of the registrant whether
the prospect of harm at the point of induction is real enough that
he can litigate it in his criminal prosecution, or must await litigation over a more direct and immediate order to participate in unlawful activity."0 6 And as to the international law rights of the
Vietnamese nation and people, one must consider the conventional
objection that the claimant cannot assert rights which do not "belong" to him.
But assume away these problems for the moment, and leave
aside the obstacles discussed above to resolving the issue in favor
of the claimant-burden of proof and so on. To refuse to decide
the issue upon the ground that it is a "political question" would
require hurdling a number of obstacles to non-decision, designedly
placed in the path of courts in deciding cases where liberty is at
stake. Two principal questions arise.
To begin, it is true that precedent committing to other agencies
the determination of issues which may arise in such cases may be
said to stand in the way of decision. The World War II judicial
review cases, Lockerty v. Phillips'6' and Yakus v. United States,'6 8
are examples. But in these, the Court properly declined jurisdiction
because Congress had merely limited the federal forums available
to test the legality of executive determinations and to challenge
the constitutionality of congressional enactments, and there arose
no issue of depriving the litigant of a federal judicial hearing of
his constitutional claims. Congress has not created such alternative
means, and has not imposed such restrictions upon the cases of
which we speak here. And in cases challenging the legality of American military involvement in criminal courts, the reasons for not
deciding are even less cogent than in the civil case. That is, the
courts cannot, save upon the most convincing demonstration of
constitutional imperative, both lend their weight to denial of liberty
and at the same moment deny the litigant whose liberty is imperiled the opportunity to litigate all legal issues which stand
between him and his freedom. "Jurisdiction," as Professors Hart
166 See note 12 supra and accompanying text.
167 319 U.S. 182 (1943).
168 321 U.S. 414 (1944).
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and Wechsler have said, "always is jurisdiction only to decide constitutionally."' 6 9 And if that is so, there is no "discretion" to refuse
to decide. That is, once it appears that a federal court has jurisdiction to decide a class of cases, the Constitution forbids foreclosing determination of the merits of such cases. 70
Pushing in upon the decision about power to decide in a criminal case is the defendant's right to a judicial forum within which
to litigate his federal claim. 7 ' Obtruding upon every habeas corpus case is the historic view that habeas corpus to test custody is
the last refuge of liberty denied, and that the custodian must an72
swer to a court as to what basis there is in law for the detention.
Does this assertion mean that the court must in a criminal or habeas
corpus case, decide the legality of the international involvement
which the defendant or petitioner has declined? Not necessarily.
This question has arisen before, and it is surprising that courts
have not moved easily from earlier analogous decisions into the
discussion of review of American military activity. In United States
v. Coplon,'17 3 United States v. Andolschek,'174 and Alderman v.
United States,'17 the assertion was made that certain government
documents should not be revealed to the defendant, though they
were either essential in the preparation of the defense or contained
proof of governmental wrongdoing which might, if explored in an
adversary hearing, lead to suppression of certain evidence against
the accused and perhaps dismissal of the charges. Rather than
demand that the evidence be produced, the Court put the government to the option: disclose or dismiss. A similar option is put to
the government in cases involving turnover of prior statements of
government witnesses under the Jencks Act and, under the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, with respect to other failures
to make discovery. If, therefore, the claim of presidential power,
pressed earnestly in the cited cases, cannot serve to justify a limited exception to the force of the exclusionary rule, one has a
difficult time justifying a limitation upon the duty of the Court
to consider the legality of a detention by consideration of all the
legal rules which are conceded to be operative under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United States.
supra note 8, at 340.
170 See United States v. Klein, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 128 (1872).
171 See HART & WECHSLER, supra note 8, at 323-25. See also United States v.
Klintock, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 144 (1820).
172 See notes 65, 108 supra.
173 185 F.2d 629 (2d Cir. 1950).
174 142 F.2d 503 (2d Cir. 1944).
175 394 U.S. 165 (1969).
169 See HART & WECHSLER,
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This determination does not necessarily involve the Executive
in litigating the validity of its claim to possess lawfully the power
it exercises in conducting a war: it says only that so long as the
Executive stays out of the federal courts, its "right to be let alone"
is perhaps arguable, but when it comes into court it must be bound
by the rules fashioned by the judiciary and the Congress for the
protection of litigants' rights.
If there is a discretion not to decide, this is it: dismissal of a
criminal case when the executive refuses to litigate the validity
of its claim of power, and release from custody of a habeas petitioner when the executive resists inquiry into all the provisions of
the "Constitution, laws and treaties," which the habeas corpus statute requires be inquired into when custody is challenged.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The view of judicial review put forward here is surely not
novel. Indeed, one hesitates to enter into a field so well plowed by
others. It seems important, though, to combat the notion that nonrules should somehow be synthesized, developed and elaborated by
a series of non-decisions leading to a non-law of justification for
ignoring the principles of order crystallized out in 1787 and embodied in the Constitution. It seems worthwhile to say that the
notion that non-law can be elaborated in this way is of fairly recent
origin and not supported by previous authority.
The notion that the President and his advisors have a broad,
sweeping and arbitrary power to enforce the laws, or conduct military affairs, in any way they see fit is gaining increasing currency.
This notion is aided, abetted and eventually given credence by a
generalized and undifferentiated "deference"-which amounts in
reality to capitulation-to assertions of executive power. In reality,
if one examines the case law and history of judicial review, deference has been a burden-shifting and burden-building device. The
litigant with a claim against a coordinate branch must carry the
argument, bear the risk of non-persuasion and be able to convince
by an appropriate quantum of proof. These rules may also at times
be phrased as rules of ripeness or exhaustion, requiring the factual
and legal picture to be filled in with considerable detail before the
Court commits itself. This is the form which deference may permissibly take. To refer to an absolute refusal to decide, grounded
in no explicit constitutional command, as "deference," is to misdescribe what is in fact surrender.
It is all very well, in this connection, to speak of "the people"
as the ultimate guardian of principle in such a case, and perhaps
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to so regard them is appropriate when justifying non-decision of
broad-scale affirmative declaratory judgment or injunction suits
addressed to large questions of national policy. But "the people"this same undifferentiated mass-had historically, unmistakably
and, at times, militantly insisted that when executive power immediately threatens personal liberty, a judicial remedy must be available. 6 This remedy need not, it has been thought, await the
outcome of any election. Far from bespeaking a sensitive regard
for a coordinate branch, therefore, judicial abdication in such
cases contributes to the erosion of the formal structural guarantees
which the Constitution codified. That these guarantees are eroding
is evident from many events, and the reasons why have been commented upon. But for the Court to contribute to their erosion is,
while understandable, not justifiable in terms of the principles of
decision which are the Court's to keep.
176
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